Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 23

1-1-2015

Platt v. Platt, 337 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2014)
Molly Kokesh

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Molly Kokesh, Court Report, Platt v. Platt, 337 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2014), 18 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 451 (2015).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

IssueC2-

COURTREIORTS

ment was one of their only obligations under the contracts.
Finally, the Court held that North Loup (lid not act negligently by Failing
to deliver water to the Webers, even though non-delivery of the water might
have been a statutory violation. Nebraska Revised Statutes section 46-263
makes it a misdemeanor for a person in charge "of a ditch or canal used for
Irrigation puirposes... to prevent or interfere with the proper delivery of water
to the person or persons having the right thereto." North Loup argued that
the statute was inapplicable because it applied to "persons" and not to "public
"entities." The Court did not address whether the statute applied to "public
entities," instead linding that the statute did not require North Loup to deliver
water to "those having no right to the water." The Court held that the Webers' nonpayment of the irrigation fees relieved North Loup of itsdtity to deliver water. Because North Loup had no duty to deliver the water at all, the
Court found that North Loup's failure to deliver the water was not negligent.
Accordingly, the Court alfinned die district court's grant of North Loup's
motion for summary judgment.
Kylie lVvse

WYOMING
Plait v. Platt, 337 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2014) (holding the district court's order
to partition in kind a ranch property, including the water rights appurtenant to
the individual parcels, through construction of a separate ditch to carry water
from one parcel to the other, was incomplete and clearly erroneous because
the record lacked competent evidence to establish that the ditch requirement
would not manifestly injure the value of the property).
Ralph E. Platt, Wayne W. Platt, and appellant Alice A. Platt ("Alice"), inherited their family ranch near Encampment, Wyoming. The Platt brothers
eventually placed their half of the ranch in the Platt Ranch Trust (die "Trust"),
one of the appellees in this case. Disagreenents concerning the operation of
the ranch led the parties to seek partition in kind from the District Court of
Carbon County, Wyoming ("district court"). Finding the parties were entitled
to partition, the district court appointed three commissioners to detennine an
equitable division of the land and water rights. The commissioners proposed
a division of the land that the parties accepted, and additionally recommended
allocation of the water rights to the parcels of land to which they were appurtenant.
In Wyoming, "[wlater rights can be partitioned along with the real property to which they pertain, provided that each parcel receives an equitable share
of the right and has enough water to permit continued use of the land as it has
historically been used." Historically, the Platt's irrigated the ranch by drawing
water from the King Tumbull Ditch No. 2 located on the neighboring Kraft
ranch, and then sending it through the North-South Ditch to flood-irrigate the
Trust's parcel. They recaptured the remaining water to irrigate Alice's parcel.
Because this system depended on a single water right, the commissioners determined that a ditch, headgate, and measuring device were necessary to meter
and distinguish Alice's water from the Trust's. Accordingly, the commissioners reconnended establishing a "Dedicated Ditch" to separately carry Alice's

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volumec 18

allocated water to her property from the Trust's property.
In the first proceeding before the district court, the commissioners recommended the parties decide the location for the Dedicated Ditch because
snow cover prevented the commissioners from locating it. When the parties
were unable to agree on a location, the district court held a second hearing to
decide the issue. The district court heard recommendations from the commissioners, Alice, and the Trust. Ultimately, the district court ordered the
parties to construct the Trust's proposed "Westerly Ditch" because, although
it was "arguably the most expensive option, lit offered the best future outcome for both parties, being that there would be mininal to no interaction between them for maintenance and inspection." The Westerly Ditch required
an easement from Kraft Ranches, a non-party. The district court ordered the
parties share the cost of construction, including the cost of installing a workable irrigation system.
Alice appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court ("Court"), arguing that
the district court's order for construction of the Westerly Ditch was legally and
factually erroneous because it required her to obtain an easement from a nonparty and to change her means of water conveyance without evidence that she
could do either without causing manifest injury to the value of her property.
On appeal, the Court first addressed whether the district court's first order
for partition in kind of the parties' property was clearly erroneous. Under
Wyoming law, partition in kind is inappropriate if "the real property cannot
be divided in kind without causing manifest injury to its value." In the first
proceeding, the district court determined the property could be partitioned in
kind "without manifest injury to the whole" despite the fact that the commissioners did not detemline the exact location of the Dedicated Ditch. The
Court found this conclusion erroneous. Given that Alice planned to use the
partitioned property for agriculture and ranching, knowing whether and how
water could be delivered to her parcel was essential to determining the land's
value. The Court noted "Ithere can be little doubt that a property with good
water rights and a means to convey the water to the land is worth considerably
more in arid Wyoming than land without one or the other." The Court held
that the location of the Dedicated Ditch would also affect the value of the
Trust's parcel because two of the ditch locations the district court considered
would have used seven acres of the Trust's valuable hay meadows. Because
the location of the Dedicated Ditch would impact the partitioned property's
value, the Court held the district court's finding that partition in kind would
not manifestly injure the value of the property, without affirmatively locating
the ditch, was clearly erroneous.
Next, the Court addressed whether the district court erred in the second
proceeding when it ordered the parties to build the Westerly Ditch because it
required an easement from a non-party, Kraft Ranches. Alice argued the district court could not require the parties to obtain an additional easement
across Kraft Ranches's property without evidence of pemlission. The Platt
brothers argued that the district court could require the easement because evidence in tie record demonstrated Kraft Ranches would grant it. The Court
began by noting that it was a matter of first hinpression whether a court has the
power to order a party to obtain an easement from a non-party in a partition
proceeding. The Court held that one approach to the issue may lie in the
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common law doctrine of "owelty," where one coparcener compensates the
other when land is not capable of being partitioned into exactly equal shares.
Accordingly, had the record supported a conclusion that it was possible to obtain an easement from Kraft Ranches and build a ditch connecting the Westerly Ditch to King Turnbull Ditch No. 2, the district court could have ordered
the Trust to pay the difference in value or divide the cost of construction between the parties to effectuate an equitable partition.
The Court held, however, that the "vague promise of future performance"
from Kraft Ranches in the commissioners' report was not specific enough to
constitute consent to an easement under the Statute of Frauds. Because the
district court did not detennine if the easement (i) could be obtained, (ii)
would allow appropriate construction and necessary maintenance of the ditch,
or (iii) would run with the land, the Court held it had no basis to determine
that the partition was eqluitable, nor that the order would not manifestly injure
the value of the partitioned property.
Next, the Court considered whether the district court's order for construction of the Westerly Ditch required Alice to change her means of conveyance
for the water she received in the partition. Alice argued she could not be
compelled to change her means of conveyance because Wyoming law requires her to petition the State Board of Control for the change, but does not
guarantee perinIssion. The Trust argued that a person can change their
means of conveyance without petitioning the Board of Control. The Court
held that the Wyoming Legislature did intend to "require a person changing
the means of conveyance of water supplied through a water right to obtain approval by the Board of Control," but that the district court did not order Alice
to change her means of conveyance. If the district court required construction
of the Westerly I)itch on remand, Alice could choose to change her means of
conveyance to bring water to her land, or choose not to change her means of
conveyance and forego her water rights. The Court noted that this result "may
be a Hobson's choice, but it may also be unavoidable." However, the Court
also noted the lack of evidence demonstrating that Alice could obtain approval
to change her means of conveyance. On remand, evidence that Alice could
not obtain permission to change the means of conveyance would negatively
affect the value of her partitioned parcel and weigh against the Westerly Ditch
as an equitable means of dividing the property.
Finally, the Court considered whether the district court abused its discretion in choosing the Westerly Ditch over the alternatives that Alice and te
commissioners suggested. Alice contended that building the Westerly Ditch
was a high cost risk because the ditch was unproven. The Trust argued that
evidence presented at trial showed the Westerly Ditch could be successfully
built and operated. The Court concluded the district court did not review evidence of construction costs for the Westerly Ditch until after selecting it, and
remanded the issue of whether the cost of building the Westerly Ditch would
manifestly injure the value of the property.
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Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order to construct the
Westerly Ditch and remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether the property could be partitioned in kind without manifestly
injuring its value, and if so, whether the Westerly Ditch is an equitable means
of dividing tie property.
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